Why is china feared

But Beijing still has an opportunity to capitalize on the industry's future: Artificial intelligence chips, specialized semiconductors that are designed for complex machine learning. Also known as AI accelerators, they are more efficient and powerful than traditional CPUs, thanks to their ability to divide up processing and perform parallel computations. For example, a Google "deep learning" experiment that took 16, CPUs to recognize a cat needed just 48 graphics-processing AI chips.

For now, expect U. But China has its foot in the door. HiSilicon, Huawei's semiconductor arm, has made considerable strides on AI chipsets for the company's new 5G smartphones.

The Federal Communications Commission will soon forbid U. The agency says there is ample evidence to conclude that the two Chinese vendors pose a national security risk to Americans, and points to similar efforts by the Trump administration and support from Congress.

The subsidies ultimately come from monthly consumer fees on wired and wireless phone bills. Coming efforts to rip out Chinese gear from rural networks will be costly, likely running into the hundreds of millions of dollars. The FCC will collect data on how widespread Chinese gear is inside certain networks and how much it will cost to replace all of it. Much of the low-cost equipment is found in small rural networks.

Congress may eventually step in to help pay for the work. It's possible that the FCC may find the funds, but it's more likely extra funding will be needed. Expect state and local governments to follow suit in banning Chinese gear.

The two biggest beneficiaries of the coming FCC ban: Ericsson and Nokia, which sell telecom products necessary for wired and wireless networks, including 5G. They'll be able to ramp up sales in the U. China's 5G strategy increasingly worries U. There's growing fear that China's leading companies are poised to out-compete and out-innovate U. That has riled U. China's main weapon for global 5G superiority: Huawei, a state-backed telecom giant with a stockpile of valuable 5G patents.

The company aims to spread its equipment in China and around the world. The U. Europe's Ericsson and Nokia do manufacture radio gear. China sees 5G as a key technology for its larger ambitions to become a global technology leader. For China, 5G's more-robust wireless broadband will support other emerging fields, ranging from advanced artificial intelligence to the Internet of Things, thus fueling its overall tech strategy and growing its economy.

China is an emerging scientific power, closing the gap with the U. China won't surpass the U. China is already an economic juggernaut. Its leaders have an even bigger ambition: Make China the world's dominant nation But Beijing is catching up fast. All things equal, it will seek greater global influence and prestige. But if its position is steadily improving, it should postpone a deadly showdown with the reigning hegemon until it has become even stronger.

Such a country should follow the dictum former Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping laid down for a rising China after the Cold War: It should hide its capabilities and bide its time. Now imagine a different scenario. A dissatisfied state has been building its power and expanding its geopolitical horizons. But then the country peaks, perhaps because its economy slows, perhaps because its own assertiveness provokes a coalition of determined rivals, or perhaps because both of these things happen at once.

The future starts to look quite forbidding; a sense of imminent danger starts to replace a feeling of limitless possibility.

In these circumstances, a revisionist power may act boldly, even aggressively, to grab what it can before it is too late. The most dangerous trajectory in world politics is a long rise followed by the prospect of a sharp decline.

As we show in our forthcoming book, Danger Zone: The Coming Conflict with China , this scenario is more common than you might think. We see the same thing in more recent cases as well. Rather, they become brash and aggressive.

They suppress dissent at home and try to regain economic momentum by creating exclusive spheres of influence abroad. They pour money into their militaries and use force to expand their influence. This behavior commonly provokes great-power tensions. In some cases, it touches disastrous wars. During a sustained economic boom, businesses enjoy rising profits and citizens get used to living large.

The country becomes a bigger player on the global stage. Then stagnation strikes. Slowing growth makes it harder for leaders to keep the public happy.

Economic underperformance weakens the country against its rivals. Fearing upheaval, leaders crack down on dissent. They maneuver desperately to keep geopolitical enemies at bay. Expansion seems like a solution—a way of grabbing economic resources and markets, making nationalism a crutch for a wounded regime, and beating back foreign threats.

Many countries have followed this path. After a fast-rising imperial Russia fell into a deep slump at the turn of the 20th century, the tsarist government cracked down hard while also enlarging its military, seeking colonial gains in East Asia and sending around , soldiers to occupy Manchuria. These moves backfired spectacularly: They antagonized Japan, which beat Russia in the first great-power war of the 20th century. A century later, Russia became aggressive under similar circumstances.

Even democratic France engaged in anxious aggrandizement after the end of its postwar economic expansion in the s. It tried to rebuild its old sphere of influence in Africa, deploying 14, troops to its former colonies and undertaking a dozen military interventions over the next two decades.

All of these cases were complicated, yet the pattern is clear. If a rapid rise gives countries the means to act boldly, the fear of decline serves up a powerful motive for rasher, more urgent expansion. The same thing often happens when fast-rising powers cause their own containment by a hostile coalition. But the more sobering parallel is this: War came when a cornered Germany grasped it would not zip past its rivals without a fight. For decades after unification in , Germany soared.

London, Paris, and St. By , time was running short. Germany was losing ground economically to a fast-growing Russia; London and France were pursuing economic containment by blocking its access to oil and iron ore. Most ominous, the military balance was shifting. France was enlarging its army; Russia was adding , men to its military and slashing the time it needed to mobilize for war. Britain announced it would build two battleships for every one built by Berlin.

But by and , it would be hopelessly overmatched. It then invaded neutral Belgium—the key to its Schlieffen Plan for a two-front war—despite the likelihood of provoking Britain. Its impending decline drove the decisions that plunged the world into war. Imperial Japan followed a similar trajectory. For a half-century after the Meiji Restoration in , Japan was rising steadily. The building of a modern economy and a fierce military allowed Tokyo to win two major wars and accumulate colonial privileges in China, Taiwan, and the Korean Peninsula.

Yet Japan was not a hyper-belligerent predator: Through the s, it cooperated with the United States, Britain, and other countries to create a cooperative security framework in the Asia-Pacific. During that decade, however, things fell apart. Growth dropped from 6. Imports also enable exponentially greater production by the people in any country importing. Imports signal labor being divided up, and labor divided amounts to labor specialization. Translated for those a bit slow on the uptake, labor specialization is the embodiment of economic growth.

Last this writer checked, strong military forces are made possible by economic growth. By seeking to meet the needs of the world, China will, if successful, strengthen the economies of countries not China. Of course, missed by Pottinger is that in describing Mr. If not, as in Pottinger were correct, stock markets in China and the U. In other words, China is a huge market for the U. By definition. Which explains a happier truth not understood by Pottinger. Work divided endlessly lifts those lucky enough to be able to divide it.

In short, what scares Pottinger should excite those who desire economic growth and progress. Their economic yearnings will logically lift the U. This is a BETA experience.