Why is iran a threat

In April the Saviz, an Iranian vessel anchored in the southern Red Sea, suffered damage to its hull believed to have been caused by limpet mines. Israel and the Saudi-led Coalition in nearby Yemen believe the Saviz has been serving as a logistic "mothership" for Iran's Houthi allies in Yemen. Speedboats, machine-guns and sophisticated communication aerials have been spotted onboard but Iran says it is there for peaceful, legitimate purposes and blames Israel for the attack.

US media reports say that over the past 18 months Israeli forces have targeted at least 12 ships bound for Syria, carrying Iranian oil and military supplies.

The fact that Syria has been at war within its own borders for the past 10 years has tended to divert attention away from Israeli military actions there. Israel has been particularly alarmed at Iran's supply of precision-guided rockets and missiles to its proxies within striking distance of Israeli cities and it has carried out numerous air strikes against these missile bases and supply lines in Syria, with little perceptible response from Iran so far.

The underlying theme of this shadow war is brinkmanship. Neither side can afford to look weak but both Iran and Israel know they need to carefully calibrate their actions so as not to trigger an all-out war. On the nuclear side it is clear that Israeli intelligence has been able to penetrate Iranian security to an astounding degree, deploying both human agents on the ground and cyber weapons to overcome Iranian countermeasures.

On the maritime shipping side, Israel is at something of a geographical disadvantage. It has good access to the Red Sea through its own naval port at Eilat but further afield Iran has the upper hand, thanks to its long Gulf coastline and Houthi proxies in Yemen. In Syria and Lebanon there is always the option for Iran to deploy its proxies to launch missile strikes against Israel but this is extremely risky. Israel has made it clear the magnitude of its response and where it would land: in Iran.

John Raine, an expert on transnational terrorism with the International Institute for Strategic Studies IISS says Israel's superior intelligence capabilities mean Iran has to content itself with "blunt" responses through its proxies.

The Iranians usually have the asymmetric advantage but with Israel they are being outboxed. The Israelis have both a longer reach, faster footwork and when they decide to strike bluntly, as they have been doing in Syria, they hit harder. Iran nuclear crisis in words. After Trump, what will Biden do about Iran?

Coupled with a bomb explosion on 20 July on a Panamanian plane and two bombings in London on 26—27 July, the disaster in Argentina led a resurgence in international terrorism.

Israel has charged that Hamas and the Lebanese-based Hizballah are responsible for the blasts; Israeli and US officials also have singled out Iran. Despite the fact that Iranian operatives have been linked to the bombing of the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires on 17 March , in which nearly 30 people were killed, the Iranian government has repeatedly denied any connection. Iranian involvement in terrorist attacks in Turkey also has been alleged.

Following the death of prominent Turkish journalist Ugur Mumcu on 24 January , segments of the Turkish press accused Iran of orchestrating the fatal car bombing. In early February, Turkish interior minister Ismet Sezgin announced the arrest of 19 members of a group called Islamic Action that he claimed had been trained in Iran. They were charged with the murder of two prosecular journalists—Mumcu and Ali Akbar Ghorbani, an Iranian dissident. Iran supports several organizations that have well-established records of committing acts of terrorism.

The Iranian government severed relations with Israel in February , soon after the overthrow of the shah. Support for Hizballah and other terror groups is another manifestation of Iranian opposition to the peace process.

Hizballah, Hamas, or other militant groups aligned with Iran can be used to disrupt the process and rattle participants. With their strong support for the peace agreements, Europe and Japan may be more likely to heed US calls for diminished ties with Iran and to support rejection of Iranian requests for debt relief from international financial institutions.

Iran strongly denounced the Israeli-Jordanian treaty signed on 26 October On the one hand, Iran has a decided need to cultivate friends, escape regional isolation, and continue important trade relations. On the other hand, it nurtures a desire to assert an independent and forceful foreign policy. Indeed, relations between Iran and its Arab neighbors have been strained for decades—especially since the revolution. Given the vast asymmetries in population and wealth between the GCC and countries such as Iran, Iraq, and Yemen, it is not surprising that security is of paramount concern.

Even though the US umbrella provides a strong deterrent against major aggression of the kind that occurred in , the American presence may be less effective against political threats and subversion. Given the complicated sociology of most GCC countries—large foreign populations and the diverse ethnic and religious backgrounds of all residents—internal security issues are an increasingly important factor in regional stability.

In this context, the Iranian threat looms large. The Gulf states have grown increasingly apprehensive that Iran is determined to become the regional hegemon.

Moreover, whatever conciliatory moves Iran may have been willing to make have been obscured by its bullying tactics over control and sovereignty of Abu Musa Island and Tunb Islands. The issue is one of principle, but strong strategic overtones also exist.

If Iran were to gain sovereignty over the islands, it could extend its territorial waters into large areas that contain much oil. To date, however, Iran has refused to accept this avenue of reconciliation. So long as the dispute remains unresolved and Iran continues to occupy and reinforce Abu Musa, tensions between Iran and the GCC will continue. A less formalized arrangement with Saudi Arabia is also in place. A similar array of actions was involved in the various military agreements.

Since the end of the Gulf War, allied aircraft have been based in Saudi Arabia to enforce the no-fly zone. Over the next 10 years, Iran could pose serious challenges to its neighbors, and its actions will continue to need deterring. Thus, an American military commitment will remain necessary to the security of the Gulf. Yet, Iran also feels threatened, and its own insecurities may contribute to the dynamics of threat escalation.

The leadership in Teheran presently feels beleaguered, paranoid, and intimidated by changes occurring both in the neighborhood and in the international environment. Without a doubt, the unpopularity of the Iranian regime is second only to the impotence of the opposition, both inside and outside the country. Most Iranians would probably rejoice if the mullahs were removed from power. Although significant voices in Teheran have favored such a dialogue in the past, the radical factions headed by Khamenei have effectively torpedoed any prospects for talks in the near future.

A revolution in Algeria leading to the establishment of an Islamic regime could have profound implications for the stability of the Mediterranean, including Egypt. A collapse of the Arab-Israeli peace process, aided and abetted by Iranian interference, also could have a profound and negative domino effect on the region.

The resurgence of Saddam Hussein or an equally ruthless successor in Iraq could likewise spell danger. From an American perspective, the search for an optimum policy towards Iran and the Gulf remains illusive and fraught with dangers. At one level, military cooperation with the GCC has gone from strength to strength, and the deployments of American forces to Kuwait during October demonstrated that it will be a long time before either Iran or Iraq can directly challenge the US and GCC with military force.

However, the political and sociological dimensions of Gulf security pose more complicated problems. The stability of the Gulf will depend on how well the US can maintain a delicate balance between security needs and political action. This material draws upon a recent book by the author, Forever Enemies? Influencers are groups that allow Tehran to expand influence within states. The ITN is Tehran's most potent deterrent at its disposal against the United States The ITN is presently—and likely to remain well into the future—Tehran's primary means of power projection and preferred instrument of influence in the Middle East.

ITN members—not Tehran—are most likely to launch attacks against U. It is important that the U. The U. Army should formulate specific responses to each category within the ITN rather than a general counter-ITN approach, recognizing their different weaknesses, levers of influence, and relations with Iran to better counter the ITN.

Because the Targeters are designed to counter U. These groups have evolved into hybrid groups now incorporated into the Iraqi political system and security forces.

Army should be careful to avoid inadvertent security cooperation activities with these groups. The Deterrers do not pose direct threats to the U. Army, but do pose a threat to regional partners.

Therefore, U. Army efforts to build partner capacity to enable U. Some members of the Stabilizers are likely to challenge U. Therefore, the U. Army should identify critical signals when these groups might seek to take action against U.